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1. Introduction  
 
Determinism and chance seem to be irreconcilable opposites: either something is chancy or it is 
deterministic but not both. Yet there are processes which appear to square the circle by being 
chancy and deterministic at once, and the appearance is backed by well-confirmed scientific 
theories such as statistical mechanics which also seem to provide us with chances for 
deterministic processes. Is this possible, and if so how? In this essay I discuss this question for 
probabilities as they occur in the empirical sciences, setting aside metaphysical questions in 
connection with free will, divine intervention and determinism in history. 
 
The first step is to come to a clear formulation of the problem. To this end we introduce the 
basic notions in play in some detail, beginning with determinism. Let W  be the class of all 
physically possible worlds. The world Ww∈ is deterministic iff for any world Ww ∈′ it is the 
case that: if w  and w′  are in the same state at some time 0t  then they are in the same state at all 
times t  (Earman, 1986, 13). The world w  is indeterministic if it is not deterministic. This 
definition can be restricted to a subsystem s  of w . Consider the subset WWs ⊆  of all possible 
worlds which contain a counterpart of s , and let s′  be the counterpart of s  in w′ . Then s  is 
deterministic iff for any world sWw ∈′  it is the case that if s  and s′  are in the same state at 
some time 0t  then they are in the same state at all times t . This makes room for partial 
determinism because it is in principle possible that s  is deterministic while (parts of) the rest of 
the world are indeterministic. The systems formulation of determinism will facilitate the 
discussion  because standard examples of deterministic processes occur in relatively small 
systems rather than the world as a whole.  
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To introduce chance we first have to define probabilities. Consider a non-empty set Ω . An 
algebra on Ω  is a set Σ  of subsets of Ω  so that Σ∈Ω , Σ∈ji σσ \  for all Σ∈ji σσ , , and 
Σ∈
= i
n
i
σ
1
  if all Σ∈iσ .1 A probability function p  is a function ]1,0[→Σ  which assigns every  
member of Σ  a number in the unit interval ]1,0[  so that 1)( =Ωp  and 
)()()( jiji ppp σσσσ +=∪  for all Ω∈ji σσ ,  for which Ø=∩ ji σσ . The requirements that p  
be in the unit interval, assign probability 1 to Ω  and satisfy the addition  rule for non-
overlapping sets are known as the axioms of probability.2 Provided that 0)( >jp σ , 
)(/)()|( jjiji ppp σσσσσ ∩=  is the conditional probability of iσ  on jσ . If we throw a normal 
die once Ω  is the set }6,5,4,3,2,1{ , and Σ  contains sets such as }3{  (‘getting number 3’), 
}6,4,2{  (‘getting an even number’) and }6,5{  (‘getting a number larger than 4’). The usual 
probability function is 6/1})({ =ip  for 6...,,1=i . The addition rule yields 2/1})6,4,2({ =p  
and 3/1})6,5({ =p . In what follows we will refer to the elements of Σ  as events. This is a 
choice of convenience motivated by the fact that the sort of things to which we will attribute 
probabilities below are most naturally spoken of as ‘events’.  
 
An alternative yet equivalent approach formulates the axioms of probability in terms of 
propositions (or sentences). To every element of Σ∈σ  there corresponds a proposition ][σπ  
which says that σ  is the case. The second and third axioms of probability then say that 
1])[( =Ωπp  where ][Ωπ  is a tautology and ])[(])[(])[][( jiji ppp σπσπσπσπ +=∨  for all 
logically incompatible propositions ][ iσπ  and ][ jσπ , where ‘∨ ’ stands for ‘or’.  
 
An interpretation of probability specifies the meaning of probability statements. Interpretations 
fall into two groups: objective and subjective. Objective probabilities are rooted in objective 
features of the world. If, say, the objective probability of obtaining heads when flipping a coin 
is 0.5, then this is so because of facts in the world and not because of what certain agents 
believe about it or because of the evidence supporting such a claim. Objective probabilities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 If n  is finite, then Σ is just an algebra. If it is closed under countable unions, it is a sigma algebra. 
2 As is well known, there are different axiomatisations of probability. Nothing in what follows depends on which 
axioms we choose (in particular, nothing depends on whether probabilities are assumed to be finitely additive or 
countably additive). For a discussion of alternative axiomatisations see Lyon (2013). 
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contrast with subjective probabilities or credences. A credence is a degree of belief an agent has 
(or ought to have) in the occurrence of a certain event. We write cr  to indicate that a certain 
probability is a credence. 
 
The two most common kinds of objective probability are relative frequencies and chances. 
Frequencies are calculated in a sequence (finite or infinite) of events of the same kind and 
hence provide a statistical summary of the distribution of certain features in that sequence.3 
Chances are different from frequencies in that they apply to single cases in virtue of intrinsic 
properties of these cases. There is a 0.5 chance that the particular coin that I am going to flip 
now will land heads. But the fact that 10% of students at LSE get first class marks does not 
warrant the claim that James has a 0.1 chance of getting a first class mark for his next essay. 
Frequncies can be both the manifestation of, and evidence for, chances, but they are not 
themselves chances. To indicate that a certain objective probability p  is a chance we write ch .  
 
Let us introduce a few notational conventions. In what follows we often speak about events 
such as getting heads when flipping a coin. If we speak about an event informally I use ‘e’ 
rather than ‘σ ’ to keep notation intuitive, and I take ‘E’ to be the outcome-specifying 
proposition saying that e obtains. It has become customary to attribute chances to propositions. 
I will follow this convention and write )(Ech  for the chance that e occurs. Likewise )(Ecr  
refers to the degree of belief of an agent that e occurs. 
 
A chance function is nontrivial if there are events for which it assumes non-extremal values, i.e. 
values different from zero or one. There is widespread consensus that nontrivial chances are 
incompatible with determinism. In an often-quoted passage Popper (1982: 105) states that 
 
‘objective physical probabibilities are incompatible with determinism; and if classical 
physics is deterministic, it must be incompatible with an objective interpretation of 
classical statistical mechanics’, 
 
and Lewis (1986: 118, original emphasis) exclaims that 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a discussion of frequentism see Hájek (1997) and La Caze (2013). 
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‘[t]o the question how chance can be reconciled with determinism […] my answer is: it 
can’t be done.’  
 
Let us refer to this view as incompatibilism; conversely, compatibilism holds that there can be 
nontrivial chances in deterministic systems.  
 
Incompatibilism is often asserted and seems to enjoy the status of an obvious truism, which is 
why one usually finds little argument for the position (we turn to exceptions below). Since 
incompatibilism undoubtedly has intuitive appeal, there is a temptation to simply leave it at 
that. Unfortunately things are more involved. In fact, there is a tension between incompatibilism 
and the fact that common sense as well as scientific theories assign probabilities to 
deterministic events. We assign nontrivial probabilities to the outcomes of gambling devices 
like coins, roulette wheels and dice even though we know that these devices are governed by 
the deterministic laws of Newtonian Mechanics, and likewise statistical mechanics attributes 
non-trivial probabilities to certain physical processes to occur even though the underlying 
mechanics is deterministic.4  
 
A conflict with incompatibilism can be avoided if the probabilities occurring in deterministic 
theories are interpreted as credences rather than chances. On that view, the probabilities we 
attach to the outcomes of roulette wheels and the like codify our ignorance about the situation 
and do not describe the physical properties of the system itself. Outcomes are determined and 
there is nothing chancy about them; we are just in an epistemic situation that does not give us 
access to the relevant information.  
 
This is unsatisfactory. There are fixed probabilities for certain events to occur, which are 
subjected to experimental test. The correctness of the probabilistic predictions of statistical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Let me add two caveats. First, in general Newtonian mechanics need not be deterministic (Norton 2008). 
However, in the applications we are concerned with in this essay (gambling devices and statistical mechanics) the 
resulting laws are deterministic. Second, we now believe that Newtonian Mechanics is just an approximation and 
the true underlying theory of the world is quantum mechanics, which is indeterministic (according to the standard 
interpretation). We can set the question of whether or not the true fundamental theory of the world is deterministic 
aside. What matters for the current discussion is the conceptual observation that probabilities are assigned to 
events in deterministic context, and the issue is how to understand such probabilities - whether probabilities of real 
roulette wheels are of that kind is a different matter.  
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mechanics has been assessed in countless laboratory experiments, and the owners of casinos 
make sure that their roulette wheels are unbiased to avoid loss when faced with attentive 
punters. These observations are difficult to square with a view that interprets these probabilities 
as credences. The chance of a roulette wheel stopping at slot No 23 seems to have nothing to do 
with what we know about it, let alone with the existence of belief-forming creatures. The values 
of these probabilities seem to be determined by how things are and not by what anybody 
believes about them.5 
 
This leaves us with a dilemma: either we deny, the above points about empirical testing 
notwithstanding, that the probabilities in deterministic theories such as statistical mechanics are 
chances, or we reconsider incompatibilism. This essay is about the second horn of the dilemma. 
In doing so I restrict attention to broadly Humean approaches to chance and set aside propensity 
interpretations.6 These include various versions of what has become known as Humean 
Objective Chance (Sections 2 and 3) and the so-called method of arbitrary functions (Section 
4). Throughout I will use the example of a coin, which can land either heads (H) or tails (T). 
This is for two reasons. First, the example is intuitively easy to grasp and yet sufficiently 
complex to make all the essential points. Second, the arguments developed with this example 
can be carried over without difficulties to more complicated cases, in particular in statistical 
mechanics. 
 
 
2. Humean Objective Chance  
 
The interpretation of probability now known as Humean Objective Chance (HOC) originates in 
the work of Lewis (1980, 1986, 1994),7 and the entire approach in which HOCs occur is known 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This point is often made in the context of statistical mechanics; for instance see Redhead (1995: 27–8). Lyon 
(2011) extends arguments of this kind to the probabilities we find in biology.  
6 For discussion of the compatibility of propensities with determinism see Clark (2001) and Berkovitz (2013). 
Alternative routes are explored in Eagle (2011), Ismael (2009) and Clark and Butterfield (1987).  
7 ‘Humean Objective Chance’ could be deemed bad terminology because chances by definition are objective. I use 
the term because it has become customary to refer to the kinds of chances introduced in this section as HOCs 
(witness the title of Lewis’ 1980 paper!). For a general introduction to Best Systems approaches see Schwarz 
(2013).  
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as the Humean Best Systems (HBS) approach. Consider an outcome-specifying proposition E. 
The following definition then encapsulates the core idea of HOC: 
 
The HOC of event e occurring at a particular time t  in world w , )(Echtw , is a number in 
the interval ]1,0[  such that 
 
(1) )(Echtw  satisfy the axioms of probability; 
(2) )(Echtw  supervene on the Humean Mosaic in the right way; 
(3) )(Echtw  be the correct plug-in for X  in the Principal Principle. 
 
The first clause is a necessary condition for HOCs to be an interpretation of probability.8 The 
second clause is more involved. The Humean Mosaic (HM) is the collection of everything that 
actually happens; that is, all occurrent facts everywhere and at all times. There is a question 
about how exactly occurrent facts ought to be characterised; the important point for now is that 
irreducible modalities, powers, propensities, necessary connections and so forth are not part of 
HM. That is the ‘Humean’ in HOC.  
 
Supervenience requires that chances be entailed by the overall pattern of events and processes 
in HM. HOCs supervene on HM, but unlike actual frequencies they don’t supervene simply. 
The problem with simple supervenience is that it makes no room for frequency tolerance. 
Imagine that in the history of the universe only one roulette wheel with 83 slots has ever been 
built and that it has been destroyed after having been spun only three times. The outcomes of 
these three spins were 25, 39 and 25. Actual frequentism commits us to saying that the chance 
for 25 is 2/3, the chance for 39 is 1/3, and all other chances are 0. This conclusion can be 
avoided if we see chances as supervening on facts not simply but instead in a Human Best 
System (HBS) way: chances are the numbers assigned to events by probability functions that 
are part of a best system (BS), where ‘best’ means that the system offers the best balance of 
simplicity, strength and fit that the events in HM allow.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The presentation of HOC in this section follows see Frigg and Hoefer (2010). I set aside problems that are 
tangential to the issue of compatibilism. Among those are the temporality of chance, the justification of the 
Principal Principle, the alleged commitment of HOC to classical physics, and undermining. For a discussion of 
these see Hoefer (2007), Pettigrew (2012), Darby (2012), and Roberts (2001), respectively.  
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Simplicity and strength are notoriously difficult to explicate.9 It is sufficient for now to go with 
intuitive notions of simplicity and strength; we will return to the issue below in the context of 
the discussion of compatibilism. Fit is more straightforward. Every system assigns probabilities 
to possible courses of history. The fit of the system is measured by the probability that it 
assigns to the actual course of history, i.e. by how likely it regards those things to happen that 
actually do happen. The more likely a system regards the actual course of history the better its 
fit. As an illustration, consider a HM that consists of just ten outcomes of a coin flip: 
HHTHTTHHTT. A system positing 5.0)()( == TchHch  has better fit than one that says 
1.0)( =Hch  and 9.0)( =Tch  because 0.150.95 < 0.510. This example also shows that a system 
has better fit when it stays close to actual frequencies, as we would intuitively expect.10 
 
The motivation behind the Principal Principle (PP) is that chances are guides to action, and PP 
establishes a connection between chances and the credences a rational agent should assign to 
certain events. In a nutshell PP says that a rational agent who knows the chance of E  should 
have credence in E  that is equal to the chance of E  as long as the agent has no inadmissible 
knowledge relating to E ’s truth. Let ‘cr ’ be an initial credence function.11 In formal terms, PP 
is the rule that 
 
   xKXEcr =)&|(        (Eq. 1)  
 
where X  is the proposition that the chance of E  takes the value x  at time t  in world w . (i.e. 
X  says ‘ xEchtw =)( ’) and K  is the agent’s total evidence pertaining to E , which must not 
contain inadmissible elements.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Lewis (1994: 478-80) for a forceful reply to this problem.  
10 This explication of fit has certain limitations. It is readily applicable only to HM’s with a finite number of 
discrete chance events. Since events we consider in what follows are of this kind this limitation need not concern 
us. A generalisation of the above definition to infinite sequences has been suggested by Elga (2004).  
11 See Lewis (1986: 87-9). The credence function is ‘initial’ in the sense that it is the credence function of a 
hypothetical actor who is able to evaluate conditional probabilities but otherwise knows absolutely nothing – in 
Alan Hájek’s words, it is the credence function of ‘super-baby’.  
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The power of PP depends on what qualifies as admissible evidence.12 Intuitively, a proposition 
is inadmissible if it ‘bypasses’ X  and provides information about E  other than the information 
contained already in X . The most obvious case of such a proposition is E  itself. If, for some 
reason (maybe because you have a reliable crystal ball), you know that E  is true, then knowing 
the truth of E  trumps any chance law about E  and a rational agent’s credence in E  should be 
1 no matter what the chance of E . Lewis (1986: 92) does not provide a definition of 
admissibility, but he offers a characterisation: ‘Admissible propositions are the sort of 
information whose impact on credence about outcomes comes entirely by way of credence 
about the chances of those outcomes.’ Within the class of admissible propositions two kinds of 
propositions are of particular significance. The first is historical information. If a proposition is 
entirely about past matters of fact, then it is admissible. Boolean combinations of such 
statements are admissible too, and so it follows that at any given time t , twH , the entire history 
of world w  up to time t , is admissible. The second kind is statements of laws of nature. As 
with historical propositions, Boolean combinations of laws are admissible too. wL , the 
conjunction of all laws of nature in w , is therefore admissible.  
 
 
3. Incompatibilism Scrutinised 
 
We will now see that one’s stand on compatibilism depends on how the details of the above are 
fleshed out. Recall from the introduction, Lewis (1986: 120) was an advocate of 
incompatibilism, but failed to provide an argument for his position and instead merely asserted 
the point: ‘There is no chance without chance. If our world is deterministic there are no chances 
in it, save chances of zero and one.’ Several authors have tried to fill this gap. Hoefer (2007: 
558-9) and Schaffer (2007: 128) provide the following reconstruction of the incompatibilist’s 
argument. Let xEchtw =)(  be the non-trivial chance of E  in world w  at time t . As we have 
seen in the last section, Lewis regards historical facts and laws as admissible. PP then tells us 
that  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The correct formulation of PP and the characterisation of admissibility are fraught with controversy. I follow 
Hoefer (2007) in preferring Lewis’ original formulation (given here). For a compact account of the various moves 
in the debate see Vranas (2004).  
9 
	  
xLHxEchEcr wtwtw == )&&)( |(  
 
Assume that E  is true.13 If w  is deterministic, then twH  and twL 	  logically imply E . Hence the 
axioms of probability dictate that  
 
1)&&)( |( == wtwtw LHxEchEcr  
 
So under determinism credences should be 0 and 1, but this is in contradiction with PP.  
 
If we stick with Lewis’ view that twH  and twL  are admissible, then the only way to avoid the 
contradiction is to deny that there is a nontrivial chance for E. Recently Schaffer (2007) has 
provided further reasons for thinking that this is the right response. He formulates six platitudes 
about chance and then argues these platitudes cannot hold true in a deterministic setting. His 
platitudes are the Principal Principle, the Basic Chance Principle, the Lawful Magnitude 
Principle, the Intrinsicness Requirement, the Future Principle, and the Causal Transition 
Constraint. We here focus on the first four.14 
 
The first of Schaffer’s platitudes is PP itself, which, as we have just seen, leads to a 
contradiction when applied in deterministic setting. Since he grants PP the status of a platitude, 
PP itself cannot be given up, which leads us to the conclusion that only trivial chances are 
compatible with determinism.  
 
The Basic Chance Principle, originally due to Bigelow, Collins and Pargetter (1993), asserts 
that if at time t  there is a non-trivial objective chance for E  in world w , then there is a 
possible world with the same history as w  up to t  and in which E  is true. Schaffer proposes a 
stronger version of this principle, his Realization Principle, which adds the requirement that the 
possible world in which E is true must have the same laws as w. If )(Echtw  is not-trivial, then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This can be done without loss of generality. The argument is mutatis mutandis the same if ‘not E’ rather E is 
true.  
14 We set aside the last two because, contra Schaffer, the Future Principle and the Causal Transition Constraint are 
not platitudes about chance. See Hoefer (2007: 554-5) for a discussion of the former; Glynn (2010: 25-6) argues 
against the latter. 
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both )(Echtw  and )( Echtw ¬  are strictly between 0 and 1 (‘¬’ stands for ‘not’), which implies 
that there is at least one possible world with the same history and laws as our world in which 
E  is true, and likewise there is at least one such possible world in whch E¬  is true. This, 
however, is precisely what determinism denies. Hence, non-trivial chances are incompatible 
with determinism.  
 
The Lawful Magnitude Principle codifies the view that chance values should fit with the values 
given by the laws of nature. If there is a chance for the coin to land heads, then this chance has 
to follow from the laws of nature. But if the laws are deterministic, they cannot imply non-
trivial probabilities (‘no probability in, no probability out’).  
 
The Intrinsicness Requirement says that if you have physically identical set-up conditions at 
two different times, then the chances of their corresponding possible outcomes must be the 
same. This platitude is violated in a deterministic world because we only have the same setup 
conditions if the system’s initial state is the same, but by determinism same initial conditions 
lead to same outcomes, which rules out non-trivial chances.  
 
This, thinks Schaffer, seals the case against compatibilism. To see how one could counter this 
argument it is instructive to notice in what way exactly determinism and chance are at 
loggerheads. The conflict is not one of simple inconsistency: there are no chance laws covering 
exactly the same events as deterministic laws. The conflict arises if we accept reductive 
relations. There is a chance law for coins, and there is a deterministic mechanical theory for 
elementary particles. These two are inconsistent once we assume that coins are made up of 
atoms and that the behaviour of the coin is therefore determined by the behaviour of the atoms.  
 
The above arguments for incompatibilism are based on giving primacy to fundamental laws 
wherever they are in conflict with (purported) non-fundamental laws (such as chance laws for 
gambling devices). This reaction is closely tied to Lewis’ metaphysics, which sees the world as 
consisting of a manifold of spacetime points which instantiate perfectly natural monadic 
properties. And this is all there is: ‘“how things are” is fully given by the fundamental, perfectly 
natural, properties and relations those things instantiate’ (Lewis 1994: 474). What counts as a 
perfectly natural property is determined by physics, which ‘is a comprehensive theory of the 
world, complete as well as correct. The world is as physics says it is, and there’s no more to 
11 
	  
say’ (Lewis 1999: 33-4). Even though Lewis rarely says so explicitly, the emphasis is clearly 
much on fundamental physics: the world is how fundamental physics says it is. Let us call this 
position Lewisian physicalism.  
 
On the basis of this metaphysics, denying that there are chances if the fundamental laws of 
physics are deterministic is a stringent move. If E  is about a perfectly natural property, then by 
assumption there cannot be a chance law for it. If, by contrast, E  is about a property that is not 
perfectly natural (such as coin and roulette wheel), then a best system will not contain laws for 
E -type events (and a fortiori no chance laws) because a best system does not say anything 
about E -type events at all.   
 
This austere elegance comes at a price: there are no laws about any non-fundamental kinds. 
Where we seem to have such laws, this is an illusion. Generalisations that look like laws in fact 
are mere rules of thumb for feeble beings incapable of applying fundamental laws to complex 
situations.  
 
A number of authors felt that this was too high a price to pay. A view of chance that denies the 
status of chance not only to probabilities attached to gambling devices, but also to the 
probabilities we find in macro-physics, genetics, engineering, meteorology, and many other 
non-fundamental sciences, has thrown out the baby with the bathwater. These probabilities 
codify information about the world and are subject to empirical test. This, so the thought 
continues, indicates that they are chances. 
 
Those intending to pursue this line of argument have to provide a reformulation of the HBS 
approach which departs from Lewis’ formulation in at least two respects. First, they have to 
argue that non-fundamental laws are part of the best system. Second, they have to reformulate 
PP so that the above contradiction no longer arises. Different approaches differ in how they 
achieve these goals.  
 
The first to present such a view was Loewer (2001, 2004). His account focusses on 
Bolzmannian statistical mechanics (BSM) as presented by (Albert 2000): the package of 
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Newtonian mechanics, the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical Postulate.15 In this approach the 
relevant system is considered to be the entire universe. Very roughly, the Past Hypothesis says 
that the universe started in a low entropy state, which is associated with a certain small part pΓ  
of the world’s entire phase space. Newtonian Mechanics provides the time evolution tφ  
specifying how a point x  of the universe’s phase space evolves over time. The Statistical 
Postulate says that we should assume a uniform probabilitiy distribution over pΓ  at time 0t , the 
time of the big bang, and generate probabilities for the system’s state being in any other part of 
the universe’s phase space at any later time 0tt >  by conditionalising on the past hypothesis 
and the system’s dynamics.16 Loewer submits that this package is a best system (2001: 618; 
2004: 1124). His reasons for thinking so are that adding the Past Hypothesis and the Statistical 
Postulate to Newtonian Mechanics results in a powerful system:  
 
‘It is simple and it is enormously informative. In particular, it entails probabilistic versions of all the 
principles of thermodynamics. That it qualifies as a best system for a world like ours is very plausible.’ 
(Loewer 2001: 618)  
 
The probabilities generated by the theory’s Statistical Postulate therefore are chances. He calls 
them ‘macro chances’, indicating that a revision to PP is needed (Loewer 2001: 618). The 
modified principle, ‘PP(macro)’, differs from PP in that it posits that ‘[m]ore detailed 
information about the micro-condition at t than that given by the macro-condition at t is 
macroscopically inadmissible’ (Loewer 2001: 618-9). Regimenting admissible information 
successfully blocks the above contradiction, and hence removes the incentive to deny the 
existence of chances in a deterministic world (we will return to Schaffer’s platitudes below). 
 
There are a number of challenges for Loewer’s approach, which are all rooted in the fact that 
all the work in Loewer’s approach is done by an appeal to simplicity. The first challenge is to 
justify why one would introduce macro chance laws at all. In BSM macrostates supervene on 
microstates and so a Lewisian physicalist may insist that BSM macrostates are as dispensable 
in the best system of the world as coins, roulette wheels, genes, steel fatigue, cloud albedo, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Loewer also includes Bohmean quantum mechanics in his discussion. For want of space I only discuss 
statistical mechanics here, but nothing is lost since (as Loewer points out) the arguments are entirely parallel for 
both cases. 
16 For an extensive discussion of statistical mechanics see Frigg (2008a), Uffink (2006) and Myrvold (2013).  
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any other not perfectly natural property. Loewer’s motivation for introducing macrostates is 
that describing a tremendously complex swarm of molecules as a gas having a certain 
macrostate simplifies things enormously and hence adding that bit of conceptual machinery to 
fundamental mechanics greatly simplifies the entire system. But this argument implicitly 
invokes a notion of simplicity that has built into it a computational component. In principle the 
behaviour of the gas is completely determined by the behaviour of its constituent molecules. 
But it would be tremendously complicated to make predictions about the gas in terms of 
molecules, and having the conceptual tool of macrostates at hand allows us to say much of 
what we actually want to say about swarms of molecules at relatively low cost.  
 
This argument only gets off the ground if the computational costs incurred in deriving a desired 
result is at least part of what we mean by simplicity; Frigg and Hoefer (2013) call this 
‘simplicity in derivation’. This is not a notion of simplicity a Lewisian physicalist finds 
natuarally appealing. One would either have to show that a Lewisian physicalist should accept 
such a notionor else argue that the position ought to be rejected altogether. Whichever of these 
options one choses, the further question then is: why stop short at BSM? The probabilistic laws 
of genetics seem to bring equal computational simplifications with them as do the laws of 
BSM, so why not include these in the best system too? And so on for many laws in the special 
sciences.  
 
A related worry is that postulating a uniform distribution over pΓ  for an event that by 
definition happens only once in the entire history of the universe, namely the big bang, seems 
conceptually problematic even if one takes frequency tolerance seriously. It is difficult to see 
how such a distribution could be seen as supervening on HM, and the only reason to accept it at 
all is its simplifying power. This is an uncomfortable move as long as we operate with an 
unexplained notion of simplicity. 
 
Even if we were prepared to set the above worries aside, there is another problem lurking. One 
can show that the fit of a system can be improved by choosing a distribution that is peaked over 
the actual initial condition (Frigg 2008a, 2010). A peaked distribution is not less simple than a 
uniform one (or at any rate only marginally less simple) while it greatly increases the fit of the 
system, and so the best system would contain a peaked rather than a uniform distribution. 
Countering this objection would involve arguing that peaked distributions come at simplicity 
14 
	  
costs that outweigh all gains in fit, which tells against their inclusion in a best system. But it is 
hard to see how such an argument could be made as long as no tight notion of simplicity is in 
place.  
 
Alternative compatibilist accounts have recently been proposed by Glynn (2010) and Frigg and 
Hoefer (2010, 2013). These accounts have in common that they regard chances as situated at 
particular levels (for instance the level of genes), and they endorse a thoroughgoing pluralism 
which allows for chances to occur (at least in principle) at every level (and not only at the level 
of BSM). They differ in how they justify and develop their position. Glynn (2010: 7) posits that 
‘there exist probabilistic high-level or special scientific laws even in such worlds [i.e. 
fundamentally deterministic worlds]’ and points out that ‘[t]he probabilities projected by these 
laws should be regarded as genuine, objective chances because the laws in question are 
genuine, objective laws’. His reason for regarding special science laws as genuine laws are 
similar to Fodor’s (1974) reasons to support the autonomy of the special sciences: higher level 
properties are typically multiply realisable at the macro level, and therefore laws about higher 
level kinds cannot follow from micro properties alone. This is because the micro theory by 
itself does not tell us which micro kinds fall into the class of realisers for a certain macro 
property, and hence is unable to ground generalisations about macro kinds. Therefore, adding 
special science laws to a system of laws makes that system more informative and stronger, and 
the probabilities in these laws are chances in Lewis’ sense (Glynn 2011: 8-9). The above 
contradiction (between determinism and non-trivial chance) is avoided by stipulating that a 
complete conjunction of all laws together with information about facts at more fundamental 
levels is inadmissible (Glynn 2011: 18-20).  
 
Frigg and Hoefer (2013) extend this line of argument in two ways. First they provide a more 
extensive argument for the conclusion that non-fundamental laws are part of a best system. The 
first step of their argument draws a parallel between the issue of compatibilism and the 
philosophy of mind, and argue that Lewisian physicalism is untenable for reasons similar to 
those put forward against eliminativism. Rejecting eliminativism makes room, at least in 
principle, for there to be laws formulated in non-fundamental terms. To show that at least some 
laws of that kind are also part of the best system, they distinguish between numerical simplicity 
(measured in terms of the number of different laws a system contains), simplicity in derivation 
(roughly, the computational costs incurred in deriving a desired result), and simplicity of 
formulation (roughly, the ease with which a law can be formulated), and argue that the gain in 
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simplicity in derivation due the introduction of non-fundamental laws far outweighs the costs 
in numerical simplicity, while the scope and the fit of the system remain constant. For this 
reason such laws should be included in a best system.  
 
The second amendment is a requirement of coherence: whenever two parts of the HBS have the 
same (or sufficiently overlapping) domains of application, then there must be a Humean 
account of how their prescriptions relate to one other. In the case where a chance law covers 
events that are also covered by deterministic laws, the less fundamental law must supervene in 
a Humean best systems way on the facts in the domain of the more fundamental law. The 
requirement is best illustrated with the above example of SM. Frigg and Hoefer take laboratory 
systems as the subject matter (rather than the entire universe). Throughout HM there are many 
copies of every system and so one can look at the distribution of initial condition over pΓ  of 
these systems. The postulate that the best system ought to contain a uniform distribution over 
pΓ  then has to be justified by arguing that such a distribution is in fact the best summary of the 
distribution of actual initial conditions. If the conditions are spread out more or less evenly, this 
arguably is the case. But if it is the case that all points are concentrated in one corner of pΓ , 
then a uniform distribution is not the right one to chose.  
 
This addresses the worries that arose in connection with Loewer’s account. It remains to be 
shown that Schaffer’s platitudes can be dealt with successfully. The first one has been dealt 
with by altering our understanding of admissibility (which, compatibilists insist, does not 
require changing Lewis’ characterisation of admissibility; rather it requires making proper use 
of that characterisation). Consistency with the realisation principle is restored by reformulating 
the principle so that the scope of the principle is restricted to histories at the relevant level: the 
‘same history up to t’ refers to the admissible history. Intrinsicness is dealt with along the same 
lines: restrict sameness of the setup to sameness with regard to admissible properties.  The 
Lawful Magnitude Principle turns out not to be a platitude at all; in fact it is a statement of 
physicalism in disguise. It is the whole point of the approaches of Loewer, Glynn, and Frigg 
and Hoefer that not all chances are deductive consequences of fundamental laws.  
 
Incompatibilists remain unconvinced. But rather than quibbling about the particulars of any of 
the above moves, they argue that the probabilities thus introduced simply aren’t chances after 
all. In this vein Lyon (2011) argues that the chances we find in BSM (and, needless to say, 
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theories of gambling devices) are not chances. His reasons are that he chooses to ‘stick with the 
usage of “chance” that Lewis, Schaffer and others prefer. This is because once we lay out all 
the platitudes we seem to have about chance, it appears that indeterministic conceptions of 
chance satisfy these platitudes better than deterministic ones can’ (Lyon 2011: 420). Lyon 
(2011: 429) is quick to point out that this does not turn BSM probabilities into credences, and 
argues that probabilities like these are of a third kind, with is neither chance nor credence and 
which he calls counterfactual probability.  
 
We have reached an impasse. If one thinks that ‘chance’ means something like propensity, 
primitive fundamentally chancy laws of nature, or other kinds of fundamental modalities, then 
one will follow Lewis and dismiss the compatibilist’s probabilities as a ‘kind of counterfeit 
chance’, which is ‘quite unlike genuine chance’ (Lewis 1986: 120). If, on the other hand, one is 
not committed to such a view, then compatibilism is a live option and the above proposals 
deserve serious considerations. There is no ultimate right and wrong in the use of a word, and 
depending on one’s other philosophical commitments one can go either way. If nothing else, 
the above discussion has at least shown where the two compatibilists and incompatibilits part 
ways.  
 
 
4. The Method of Arbitrary Functions  
 
Let us now briefly turn to an approach that is broadly Humean (in that it does not appeal to 
propensities, powers and the like) but does not stand in the Lewisian best systems tradition: the 
method of arbitrary functions (MAF). The method has been introduced by Poincaré in 1896 and 
has subsequently been developed by a number of eminent mathematicians, among them Borel, 
Fréchet, Hopf, and Khinchin.17 Recently Strevens (2011) and Myrvold (2011) have, in different 
ways, appealed to the method to make sense of objective probabilities in physics.  
 
MAF is a mathematical technique to determine a unique probability distribution for the 
outcomes of mechanical games of chance, or the evolution of deterministic mechanical systems 
more generally. A discussion of the entire theory is beyond the scope of this essay; we restrict 
ourselves to illustrating the main ideas with the example of the coin. The mechanical state of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Von Plato (1983) provides a readable historical introduction to the method.  
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coin can be described by two sets of variables: the angle at which the coin stands with respect to 
the ground and the angular velocity ω  (how fast the coin rotates), and its height above ground 
and the vertical velocity v  (how fast it is thrown upwards when tossed). Assuming the coin is 
tossed vertically and gravity is the only force acting on it, one can classify the initial conditions 
according to the outcomes they will produce. If the coin is always tossed at the same height and 
with the same initial angle, variations in ω  and v  alone determine the outcome completely 
(because the movement of a coin is deterministic). Keller (1986) has done the calculations and 
the result is the graph shown in Figure 1, where black initial conditions result in tails and white 
ones in heads.18  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Black initial conditions result in tails; white ones in heads. 
 
Assuming a probability distribution ),( ωρ v  over initial conditions, the probability for heads is 
just the probability of the initial conditions resulting in heads, which can be calculated by 
integrating ),( ωρ v  over the white regions (and mutatis mutandis for tails). MAF comes into 
play when we ask how the result of these calculations depends on our choice of ),( ωρ v . The 
basic result MAF seeks to establish is that for ‘reasonable’ ),( ωρ v  the result does not depend 
on the precise shape of ),( ωρ v ; that is, the end result is the same for all ),( ωρ v  unless we start 
with a completely unreasonable ),( ωρ v  (we expect to retrieve the usual rule saying that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The graph is a reproduction from Diaconis (1998: 803). 
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chance for either heads or tails is 0.5). The crucial question is of course what counts as 
reasonable, and the answer depends (as one would expect) on the particulars of the situation. 
Poincaré’s original example was a roulette wheel and he argued that we obtain the usual 
probabilities as long as the initial probability distribution does not fluctuate wildly (in technical 
terms: the modulo of the derivative of the distribution has to be bounded). This approach will 
work here too. As we see in Figure 1, the black and white lines are relatively fine, and they 
become finer as we move towards higher ω  and v ; unless ),( ωρ v  fluctuates strongly on a 
scale of the width of the stripes, the result of the integration will not depend much on the 
concrete shape of ),( ωρ v . An arbitrary ),( ωρ v  will do to determine the probabilities for heads 
or tails – this insight gave the method its name.  
 
In sum, MAF shows that an (almost) arbitrary distribution yields the same outcome 
probabilities under a deterministic physical dynamics, which seems to provide a reconciliation 
of determinism and chance. This enthusiasm is premature. MAF does not create probabilities ex 
nihilo; MAF only shows that outcome probabilities are constant under the variation of given 
input probabilities. For this reason MAF per se does not ground a particular interpretation of 
probability, let alone provide us with a notion of deterministic chance. Whether or not MAF 
assists a reconciliation of chance and determinism depends on where probability distributions 
over initial conditions come from.  
 
Savage (1973) interprets both input and output probabilities as  credences  and hence denies 
that MAF plays any role in reconciling chance and determinism. Myrvold (2011: 76) follows 
Savage in interpreting input probabilities as credences, but sees outcome probabilities as 
epistemic chances. This choice of terminology indicates that outcome probabilities are 
determined both by epistemic and physical considerations, namely the initial credence function 
and the dynamics of the system. Since both are essential and irreducible, the resulting 
conception of probability is a combination of epistemic and physical factors.  The chance aspect 
of these probabilities is highlighted by the fact that they are taken to satisfy a principle that is 
structurally similar to PP.   
 
There is a question, though, whether the chance aspect of Myrvold’s epistemic chances is 
strong enough to ground a reconciliation of chance and determinism. A sceptic could argue that 
what MAF shows is that all reasonable initial credence functions converge towards the same 
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credence function under the system’s dynamics. This shows that all reasonable agents must 
have the same outcome probabilities, but it does not show that the outcome probabilities are 
anything other than credences: credences in, credences out. Outcome probabilities are 
physically constrained credences, but credences nevertheless.  
 
Strevens takes a different line and aims to interpret MAF probabilities as physical probabilities 
without an epistemic component. He interprets the initial distribution ),( ωρ v  as expressing 
properties of the frequencies of initial conditions.  Such frequencies are facts about physical 
world, but Strevens’ (2011: 350) emphasises that these need not be probabilistic facts.  
Nothing forces us to interpret frequencies as probabilities; and given all the well-known 
difficulties of frequentism, interpreting frequencies as probabilities is best avoided. But this 
does not prevent us from regarding the outcome distribution as a probability distribution. So 
the crucial move in Strevens’ account is to regard only the outcome of a process covered by 
MAF as probabilitiy. Strevens (2011: 351) calls these probabilities ‘microconstant 
probabilities’. They are physical probabilities in that they are determined solely by facts about 
the frequency of initial conditions and properties of the system’s dynamics.  
 
Even though Strevens’ account seems to come close to a reconciliation of chance and 
determinism, it is not clear whether we have passed the finishing line. Strevens never refers to 
microconstant probabilities as chances; nor does he ever discuss the relation between 
microconstant probabilities and chances. It is therefore unclear whether his account advances 
the compatibilist’s cause. However, not much seems to be needed to turn microconstant 
probabilities into Humean chances (as defined by compatibilists). Borrowing from the best 
systems account the idea of coherence one could say that ),( ωρ v  should be chosen such that it 
provides the best summary of actual initial conditions, and MAF then shows that outcome 
probabilities do not depend sensitively on our standards of simplicity (which will determine 
which function we fit to the actual points). Once ),( ωρ v  is understood in this way, MAF 
probabilities can at least in principle be understood as Humean chances in the compatibilists’ 
sense, which would justify their status as chances.  
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